



Title: Vision of Human-Centred Development: A Study in Moral Economy

Citation: Green, Reginald H. (1993) 'Vision of Human Centered Development: A Study in Moral Economy'. In: C. Legum & G. Mmari (eds.), Mwalimu: The Influence of Nyerere. London: Britain Tanzania Society with James Currey/Africa World Press/Mkuki Na Nyota: 80-107.

Version: Final version.

Rights holder: Boydell & Brewer

Terms of use: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs 4.0 License. To view a copy of the license please see:

<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

This is a download from OpenDocs at the Institute of Development Studies

EDITED BY
COLIN LEGUM
& GEOFFREY MMARI

Mwalimu
The Influence
of Nyerere



BRITAIN-TANZANIA SOCIETY
in association with

JAMES CURREY
LONDON

MKUKI NA NYOTA
DAR ES SALAAM

AFRICA WORLD PRESS
TRENTON

Contents

Preface	vii
J. ROGER CARTER	
The Contributors	ix
1 The Person Nyerere	1
THE RIGHT REVEREND TREVOR HUDDLESTON CR	
2 Approach to Rural Mass Poverty	9
IRENE & ROLAND BROWN	
3 The Management of Tribal & Religious Diversity	23
C. K. OMARI	
4 Contribution to Rural Development: <i>Ujamaa</i> & Villagisation	32
DONATUS KOMBA	
5 Education for Self-Reliance	46
A. G. ISHUMI & T. L. MALIYAMKONO	
6 One-Party Democracy & the Multi-Party State	61
A. N. KWEKA	
7 Vision of Human-Centred Development: A Study in Moral Economy	80
REGINALD HERBOLD GREEN	
8 Development Strategy & Crisis Management	108
KNUD ERIK SVENDSEN	

J

Vision of Human-Centred Development: A Study In Moral Economy

REGINALD HERBOLD GREEN

To plan is to choose.
Choose to go forward.
— J.K. Nyerere

Mwalimu Nyerere is not primarily a political economist, nor is he in any sense a technical economist. As is evident from his time as president, his role in the creation of the Southern African Development Community (then the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference), and his post-presidential heading of the South Commission, he does believe production economics and the political economy of distribution (of power and justice as well as of goods and services) are important. The reason lies in his perception of development.

For Mwalimu development is about people. He said 'man', but would probably accept the change as he agrees that women are often exploited and excluded on gender lines, and the *Arusha Declaration* includes sex in its list of unacceptable bases for differentiation. Human beings are perceived by him as the ends as well as the chief means; as the justification for, as well as the judges of, development.

Development is not in this context to be read simply as economic development. In his perspective (as in that of most poor people) the economics of production and distribution (in particular those to make possible escape from poverty) are seen as necessary, if never sufficient, means to development. Human development, including household livelihood development as seen by human beings and by society, is perceived as a basic human right. In Mwalimu's case the argument is not that traditional human rights should be postponed, but rather that the achievement of freedom of expression and of voting in Tanzania, as the 1950s turned into the 1960s, was robbed of much of its meaning by the lack of freedom from hunger and, especially for rural women, from excessive workloads, so that priority needed to be given to catching up on social and economic rights.

The stress laid on people may lead either to a misinterpretation of Mwalimu's concept of human-centred development as individualist in the European enlightenment/1980s neo-liberal tradition, or to supposing a contradiction lies between it and the central role he believes States must play in development. This is a misreading; people for Mwalimu (as in both historic African social perceptions and in Roman Catholic social doctrine) exist only in their relationships with other people and with human-constructed institutions, that is, in society. Certainly, there is, in both thought and practice, a tension between human development in society in relationship to others, and the interests (even rights) of individual human beings. That tension is the common coin of socio-political conceptualisation and practice, not unique to Nyerere nor to Tanzania.

Mwalimu's overriding concern in respect of economics and political economy is very similar to one of Adam Smith's main concerns. Smith, who styled himself a moral philosopher, believed for both practical and normative reasons that no nation could be great and prosperous if the majority of its people were poor and miserable. He contended that it was a primary duty in 'moral economy' to enable them to escape from what we would now call absolute poverty, and that making this possible is the primary economic duty of the State. On the particular functions of the State, Smith and Nyerere (in very different contexts) certainly did not come to similar conclusions. Even so, Smith's very similar moral distaste for collusive behaviour by entrepreneurs of self-enrichment and by economic power clusters turning the State into their tool is almost as robustly and repeatedly stated as Nyerere's has been.

A Problem of Levels and Audiences

The writings and speeches of Nyerere do not lend themselves to easy analysis, but do lend themselves to easy misreading as hopelessly self-contradictory. While there are tensions and secondary contradictions in his thinking, it is a misreading to suppose they are basic. Two factors explain many of the apparent clashes.

First, Mwalimu's thought has not been static. Both additional reading and thought and, probably even more, experience have led to change. This change is evolutionary as to the central vision of development, but sometimes much more revolutionary, or at least discontinuous, so far as economic instruments are concerned.

Second, Mwalimu's thought is not simple; nor has he fulfilled only one role. Practical politician and statesman; pragmatic negotiator and principled prophet; consciousness-enhancing teacher and advocate; moral and development philosopher and publicist are some of the most evident pairs. Clearly, what is emphasised and how it is presented varies, depending on

the purpose or, more usually, balance of purposes. Because as president he had not time to write reflective overall volumes, Nyerere's written record consists largely of speeches of very varying purposes to diverse audiences; of quite uneven importance at the time, and doubtless of hugely different degrees of ephemerality and lasting importance. This is supplemented by memories, not always accurate, of verbal communications or unpublished speeches and papers even more subject to the same limitations.

The other standard difficulty of trying to guess how much input a major figure made in any particular speech or paper does not usually hold. No published, and no significant, speech or paper has been other than to his outline and revised by him. Evidently the same certainty cannot hold for joint products (for example, the Arusha Declaration is largely his, while the South Commission Report is very much a composite). This is even more true of official papers issued on behalf of the presidency.

In each of his roles, and in most individual speeches, Mwalimu has been concerned, albeit to varying degrees, with both distributional/relational and production economics. For example, in its early conceptualisation *ujamaa* was basically an African social-contract modelling exercise. In that respect it resembles Locke rather than Rousseau, let alone Hobbes. The moral economic concern is present, but without much guidance as to production. Later speeches raised the stress on production economics on the basis that modern technology and economies of scale both allowed and required modifying social as well as economic organisation so long as basic equity concerns were met. However, in practice, production enhancement (as opposed to participation and access to services) was never central to *ujamaa* rural policy articulation and practice, to the despair of some political economic practitioners who saw major but lost opportunities on that front. Since dominant perceptions, including the president's, of what villagers wished to do in common were wrong on the economic front (partly because the technological possibilities were something of an optical illusion and partly because little effort was made to research and extend them) this lack of emphasis may have been just as well. It does, however, illustrate Mwalimu's willingness to delegate large areas of socio-economic policy articulation with, arguably, too infrequent critical examination of results. In general President Nyerere was very wise in delegating with little interference but, arguably, less so in not institutionalising reporting back for monitoring and review.

Pragmatism and Principles

If development is about people, and economics is important as a means to empowering them, then economic policies, institutions and programmes are means to the end of development. Failure of a policy or institution,

therefore, or a changed context, is a good reason to alter the policy or institution; even suddenly and radically. In that sense Nyerere was usually highly pragmatic on economic policies and institutions.

The exceptions appear to have been largely cases in which a pragmatic, institutional or procedural issue had become intertwined with a point of principle. An example was the 1972 Income Tax Bill. In practice its main provisions simplified the taxation system by cutting out all deductions, broadening the nil tax band and separating spouses' incomes for tax purposes, rather than significantly altering progressivity or incentives (other than for both spouses to work). However, the National Assembly in a preliminary vote rejected it after a debate opposing progressive taxation. The president then indicated that he would view the issue as one of confidence and call presidential and parliamentary elections if the Bill was not reconsidered and passed; which it was. This decision rather startled his economic technocrats who, given the actual content of the Bill, had considered amendments on secondary items as a matter of political prudence rather than principle.

Private ownership of productive assets is usually assumed to have been an exception to this pragmatism, but Nyerere at no point argued for all productive property to be State-owned. Indeed, at least in respect of agrarian property and small business, his preferred mode was a communal/household/co-operative mix which drove more orthodox Marxists into at least as great fits of irritation as it did orthodox capitalists. Accountability, protection of the public interest, avoidance of exploitation and limiting the degree of foreign ownership, appear to have played more basic roles than narrowly-defined 'mode of production' questions. The separation of public office from private business ownership has rested primarily on the very Smithian concern of conflict (or collusion) of interest, not on a moral aversion to all enterprise proprietors or managers.

Indeed, instrumental pragmatism was arguably carried too far. Policy, and especially institutional structure shifts, were embraced without careful enough examination of whether the policies or institutions were substantial contributors to the problem or could readily be improved by marginal modification. Nor was adequate attention always paid to whether the proposed new policies and institutions were relevant to overcoming the problems, or could in practice be implemented effectively enough to produce the desired results.

A very evident example is the post-1970 cycles from basically co-operative, to marketing authority, to marketing board/co-operative to mixed agricultural produce marketing for major crops. What could have been solved within any of the systems (for example, enforcing prompt payment, representational or market accountability, probity) was not done, and expensive shifts were made both without reference to historic experience as to what they could not achieve (not least radically lower costs or higher world prices), nor to resolving the conundrum that any produce buyer (including private

ones) could hold the banking system (and ultimately the taxpayer via the Treasury) to ransom by threatening not to buy from the peasants because it was politically and morally unacceptable. While the detailed mistakes were clearly not articulated by the president personally, the general tendency to substitute frenetic institutional change for serious problem-solving in a major field over the last 15 years of his presidency, was a serious constraint on making good his rural-household-focused development vision, and indeed remains so today.

'Argue, Don't Shout': Constraints On the Possible

Mwalimu has certainly neither assumed that what existed could not be altered, nor that the possible was always (or even usually) the same as that which was desirable in principle. It may well be that he erred on the side of assuming more could be altered faster than was in fact the case, but an ultra-cautious or pessimistic perspective would have achieved far less positive change as well as incurring fewer costs of over-extension. Mwalimu has always had a clear realisation that Tanzania and the State were historically and internationally constrained, and advocated negotiating to maximise degrees of freedom, not shouting as one rushed headlong into a brick wall.

Probably the most dramatic case is that of relations with the World Bank and IMF in 1979-85. The president objected both to some elements of the Bank/Fund package proposals and to their neo-liberal rhetoric, as well as more basically to their rather overt attempt to introduce comprehensive external vetting of, rather than advice on, economic and social policy. So long as he was advised that alternative approaches might be viable, and believed Tanzanian negotiators had not exhausted the limits of the attainable, he resisted the first Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). When, in 1984, he became convinced no alternative resource mobilisation approach was viable he sharply shifted position. Most of the SAP changes date to the 1984 Budget. (Significantly it was crafted outside any actual set of external proposals, and without formal consultation with international financial institutions, even if it was drawn up with an eye to external acceptability). That Budget, like the 1985 negotiation of the 1986 SAP, dates from his presidency. Final approval by the National Executive Committee of *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) in 1986 was secured only because of his strong advocacy of it as the best possible outcome under the circumstances. That also illustrates his determined loyalty to the new president while serving as continuing Party chairman. That no similar controversy arose in respect to 'good governance'/democratisation was because by the mid-1980s Nyerere believed that the quarter of a century since 1960 had made the one-party approach to development, as well as to governance, obsolete, and experience (particularly, but not only, on journeys abroad) had taught him it was dangerously vulnerable to abuse. His efforts in 1986 to revitalise and reform CCM convinced him that the external stimulus of rival parties had

become necessary. Therefore, his advocacy of and teaching toward change in respect to Tanzania and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) pre-dates the new Western fashion for advocating multi-party democracy instead of centralised, authoritarian, Bismarckian 'development States'.

Principles Not For Sale

Pragmatism on means, and realism on room for manoeuvre, have not been seen by Nyerere as inconsistent with firmness as to principles. The pre-Arusha Declaration economic strategy was arguably, in large measure, a colonial inheritance. But it was accepted (indeed not seriously reviewed or modified) for five years because it was seen as being consistent with general increases in household economic welfare and with Tanzanian advancement toward the ownership and control of economic activity. Its failure to further these objectives, even during a period of moderate growth, led to the major policy and institutional transformation embodied in the Arusha Declaration.

Domestically-organised opposition to economic policy changes, other than inertia and avoidance, was usually low and low-powered over 1961-85. Moreover most of what there was, was within TANU/CCM. Therefore preserving principle while altering policy created few clashes.

Externally matters were somewhat different, and unpredictably so. The principle was that the State should be accountable to Tanzanians and therefore foreign policy dictation was unacceptable. But this did not mean either rejection of all foreign 'rules of the road' (on compensation after nationalisation for example), or a belief that it was practicable to demand support irrespective of the proposed resource-provider's views. Clashes therefore occurred not so much over basic differences, but over the style of external response, for example, with the then Federal Germany over the degree of downgrading of the then German Democratic Republic's diplomatic status after Union with Zanzibar. The breaks on economic aid with the UK, following the weak British reaction to the Rhodesian rebellion in 1965 and the Tanzanian decision in 1968 to shift responsibility for colonial pensions to the UK, were partly miscalculations on both sides (avoided in the later case of the nationalisation of buildings) and partly rather emotional and adventurist responses by the UK rather than Tanzania.

Participation, Production and Progress

Because basic human needs, including public services, socio-political freedoms and time to participate in governance, all require material resources, Mwalimu has always seen growth in production of resources as important. He would reserve zero growth for countries and persons who were already clearly not poor. Indeed, so long as inflation was low, the

salary policy for the public service was to hold the middle- and upper-level scales (mediated for individuals by promotion), to allow increases at the bottom in order to reduce the gap between top and bottom incomes.

This concern also led to condemnation of waste which Mwalimu branded as a sin particularly in poor, would-be socialist countries. Efficiency in providing outputs or services and in achieving an investible surplus were always tests applied to public sector enterprises. Failure in respect of these tests led to a real risk of the managers losing their position and/or institutional restructuring, although whether this happened as often or as efficiently as it should have done is a rather different question.

For the same reason (seeing resources and investment as key to making human-centred development feasible) Mwalimu believes unpleasant economic policy decisions and actions, and present austerity for future returns, are likely to be frequently necessary. Tanzania has followed a relatively high and relatively well-enforced (as well as progressive) overall tax policy, and in both 1974 and 1980-1 its response to economic crises included severe austerity; for the Government as well as, or more than, for the public. Equity in sacrifice and the preservation of basic services and external defence capacity, not the avoidance of sacrifice, have been the underlying constraints on cuts.

An abiding theme in Nyerere's policies was broadening access to participation (particularly by rural farming households) in production, access to services, and involvement in governance and politics. In that sense he acted (with some deviations in practice) on the premise that good governance accountable to the perceived needs of ordinary people (that is, as perceived by them) was the goal. He saw well-crafted governance designed by experts to deliver what they believed was good for people, as inadequate despite an abiding, but not always well rewarded, faith in expertise. In that sense the accountability argument for national independence also informs his view of domestic governance; unlike many other African leaders. He has, however, been frank in saying that 'all governments, my own included' have been too prone to do things for people (especially those of the rural family sector) without first asking them what their needs, desires, priorities and abilities were.

Although Mwalimu also always set a very high value on expertise, he was aware that the limited horizons and educational opportunities imposed by history and resource constraints on most ordinary households did not limit their ability to identify some potential, or even necessary, ways forward. But a very high priority was placed on acquiring and using expertise, and a serious hearing was almost always given to those who had, or appeared to have, such experience. This was combined with frequent, and not always successful, delegation of substantial policy articulation and implementation to experts, especially economic policy and its implementation.

Participation, accountability, and the creative use of expertise inherently

give rise to tensions and potential contradictions when pursued together. Accountable expertise in the service of a participatory process is much easier to state as an ideal than to implement in practice; especially in economic enterprises. Decentralised accountability has a tendency to lead to incoherence at broader levels, while experts (economic and other) have a tendency to avoid acquiring adequate contextual knowledge, to resent effective accountability to non-experts, and to confuse technical means (on which they are expert) with socio-political ends (on which they usually are not). Mwalimu as president probably erred on the side of giving too much freedom to experts and of failing to recognise the degree to which choice of means influences the end results attained. Perhaps the most glaring example was the 1975-80 delegation of agricultural marketing to an expert group in practice accountable only to the World Bank. Their utter failure to maintain oversight and guidance for marketing bodies; to propose coherent and sustainable grower price structures; to pay attention to waste avoidance; or to have any plausible agricultural strategy, whether based on market incentives, need, or technical potential, cost, and continues to cost, Tanzania heavily.

Delegation to experts, when the ministers to whom they were responsible were contextually and politically informed, often worked well (even when the experts were expatriate); as in much of the initial establishment of public enterprise in 1967-8, and the ongoing restructuring of tax policy in 1970-4 and the early 1980s. The problem is real, not perceptual, and one of differing strengths and limitations rather than ideological in the colloquial sense. 'Left' political 'experts' have frequently been at least as contextually blinkered and as resentful of accountability constraints as 'Right' expatriates.

Participation and Decentralisation

Mwalimu, perhaps predictably given both African tradition and his stress on the importance of human relations at inter-personal as well as systemic level, has consistently favoured decentralisation of accountability and responsibility. This has been much more complex in practice with recurrent bursts of decentralisation followed by a drift to centralisation (indeed over 1961-70 the latter was dominant), and with the tensions between direct local and indirect institutional accountability frequently inhibiting both.

Decentralisation in production underlaid the rural bias in the allocation of new resources, and of policy attention and political priority (not always, it must be said, very effectively). It also informed attempts to create regional growth poles and to reduce the economic dominance of Dar es Salaam. It was, for example, one element in the decision to move the capital. This perspective appears to have had a cumulative impact: rural/urban differentials have shrunk, and a number of growth poles (Morogoro and Mbeya for example) have emerged. Tying the results to particular initiatives other than the only partially successful drive for universal access to basic public

services (alternatively stylable basic human investment through basic education, health services and water supply) is much harder. Decentralisation in governance has turned on having decisions about basic services made (or at least articulated) at a small enough unit level to allow direct participation in decisions, as well as in implementation and review by those most affected. The evident means to this (elected local and regional governance) has been used much more erratically, with a very long hiatus from the abolition of the pre-1974 system to the establishment of a new one; or, more accurately, the resurrection of the old with no more than trivial reforms and with no regional-tier representative bodies at any stage. Both consultative and 'informal' accountability mechanisms have been pervasive in influencing decisions but have hardly formed an adequate structure of accountability.

However, resource constraints (especially the lack of informed and experienced personnel) and economies of scale have constantly led to a drift towards centralisation. The old district council head tax was inequitable, inefficient and extravagant in use of personnel and attention; district council administration of primary health and education (and later regional government administration of Agriculture Extension) often left almost everything to be desired. Thus, reforms predicated on efficiency (avoidance of waste, mobilisation of resources and provision of services) were repeatedly centralised. Further, it would in some terms have been a serious error to assume that actual local power structures were such as to make decentralisation to administrative units responsible to locally elected bodies synonymous with accountability to ordinary people. Mwalimu was well aware of this, albeit somewhat reticent about stressing it publicly. Standby and corrective central authority over local decisions was therefore perceived to be desirable; presumably by the president as well as more generally.

Production, Efficiency and Rights

The supposed Cartesian dichotomy of production before traditional human rights or traditional human rights before development has not characterised Mwalimu's thought or practice. He has seen the right to development, including economic participation and ongoing involvement in governance, as interacting with traditional human rights, and has believed progress toward fuller attainment of the former to be necessary to make the latter more meaningful. In general, traditional rights appeared to him to have progressed further (providing a useful base from which to defend the right to development) implying a general priority in resource allocation to promote social and economic rights empowerment.

Tanzania has had a competitive electoral system for over 30 years and, following the institution of a one-party system, a high proportion of office-holders held accountable by the electorate through enforced retirement. With rare exceptions it has had an independent, albeit at lower levels not especially efficient or well respected, judicial system. An Ombudsman

with some impact exists as, subject to very real resource constraints on being heard, does freedom of expression. Freedom of religion has never been an issue except when, as in family law, it conflicts with the freedoms of other people. Administrative and police non-feasance or malfeasance (all too prevalent in Tanzania as in any other country but probably well below the world average) are not approved and are subject to sanction. A notable example was the prosecution for murder of senior police and prison officers in a torture case involving witchcraft murder suspects, and the resignation of the then Interior Minister (now president) not because he ordered, condoned or even knew of the torture, but because he was ultimately responsible for the conduct of his officers. (Ironically, public opinion in the concerned areas was in large part behind the convicted officials.) The actual availability of these rights has varied, as is discussed in the essay in this volume by Professor Read.

Mwalimu's view that more resources would solidify and broaden effective access to traditional human rights was basically correct. A degree of economic independence, and of free time in which to participate after meeting basic survival needs, is conducive to fuller political participation. Better paid magistrates and police officers with more adequate resources (including training) are less open to bribery, more committed to getting their work done expeditiously and less tempted to cut corners. The traditional economic and social/political and personal human rights dichotomy (or its community/individual variant) is basically a false one. The need is for a broad-front advance toward fuller accessibility to all the rights, and the basic problems are ones of balance and allocation of scarce resources.

Making and Executing Decisions

Consensus (well over 50 per cent support although not necessarily unanimity) is Mwalimu's preferred method of decision-making. It was a route he followed as president and as chairman of CCM in that he rarely pushed through a decision in a deeply-divided Cabinet or National Executive, and still more rarely used his undoubted power and prestige to impose his own views when they were shared by a minority.

In many respects broad consensus on economic policy decision-making has served Tanzania well. Although decisions have sometimes taken longer to emerge, they have, with rare exceptions, enjoyed the full support of the decision-making bodies and also broad public support. Combined with fairly good access to decision-makers for presentation of positions and a far from identikit leadership, this approach has usually been an effective check on action which was nakedly unwise or broadly opposed.

However, two problems have arisen. The first is in one sense a measure of CCM's success as a pluralist, internally-competitive body. The range of

positions is very wide: one Cabinet was only slightly exaggeratedly described as ranging from one minister who would have been at home in a Thatcher Cabinet to two who viewed Chairman Mao Tse-tung as prone to rightist deviations. Under these circumstances consensus in Party and Government was sometimes harder to achieve, and less clear-cut in content, than would have been the case with a multi-party system with, presumably, a narrower range of positions in any one Party or coalition.

The second problem has been a prolonged inability to make decisions when the alternatives enjoying support were in opposing directions, so a synthesis was impossible and a compromise was really a choice for drift or overall cross-cancellation of individual policies. The first serious example in respect of economic policy came in 1981-4. One position advised significant changes centred on restoring fiscal balance, rebuilding exports, and reaching a bargained accommodation with the IMF and World Bank to safeguard and augment resource transfers. Its proponents did not deny that the last element required measures they, and the president, saw as undesirable. The other position advised full confrontation with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and, increasingly, with most bilateral sources of finance, coupled with a totally new and totally non-operational 'go it alone' programme of economic rehabilitation.

For three years the president declined to choose and approved enough individual proposals from each camp (including fiscal stringency and export promotion, but also confrontation with the IFIs) to create an appearance of brokered compromise, although in reality this would have amounted to substantial cross-cancelling with no strategic thrust in either direction. The objective economic situation eroded steadily until early 1984 when Mwalimu accepted that a decision one way or another was essential (consensual or not) and that the proponents of the second position were unable to articulate any credible set of measures to implement their proposals however desirable they might be in theory.

The rolling crisis of the 1981-4 strategic repositioning was the only major case of blocked policy decisions while Mwalimu was president. In the ensuing eight years (and especially since he retired as Chairman of CCM) it has become more common both to postpone crucial choices and to act with neither real consensus nor consideration of consequences.

Teach and Negotiate: Don't Order and Shout

'Mwalimu' is not Julius Nyerere's and his people's title of choice by accident. His most abiding presence and style is that of a teacher. Mwalimu believes in the power of reasoned discourse and exposition linked to a passionate advocacy of principled positions and practicable (at least in theory) roads toward them. In general this approach has served Tanzanians well, and the greatest misfortunes have arisen when he either let himself be convinced by less reasoned approaches (as in the nationalisation of rented

buildings whose origin, however disguised, was anti-Asian chauvinism) or became so irritated by disruptive 'pupils' as to resort to shouting, as, for example, in the 1983 economic sabotage campaign which he could, and should, have blocked or recast into less dangerous form.

However, Mwalimu was not bemused into supposing that reason can override interest, or that all interests are identical. He knew that teaching needed to be complemented by negotiation; domestically as well as externally. In respect to the acquisition of rented buildings, for example, a series of major amendments to initial proposals exempted retired people with small incomes who used Swahili-style housing as a pension source; took account of the position of owners of new premises who had clearly not had time to collect excessive rents; safeguarded bank depositors and insurance policy holders (or the taxpayer) by reinstating mortgage holders' rights; and, to a degree, protected mixed occupiers/landlords. These amendments radically changed what began as a nearly pure landlord confiscation measure and were accepted, and apparently welcomed, by the president on the basis of logic, equity, political realism and as a negotiated compromise.

This example illustrates two aspects of the way in which domestic negotiation proceeded. The first is the very frank and lively debates, involving senior politicians, ministers and officials, on how best to implement policy decisions, listening to and acting on diverse viewpoints. The second, and much more problematic, is the opaqueness and almost randomness of the process, especially for anyone not directly involved. The key Treasury and Attorney General's officials who modified the buildings acquisitions articulation were not by position (even if they happened to be by disposition) logical or automatic collectors and sifters of presentations of divergent valid interests. Nor were the Attorney General and Minister for Finance the most obvious political mentors for such a process. Clearly the collection and mediation process was, and is, neither transparent nor systematic enough. That criticism also relates to the president's (otherwise highly effective and principled) regular collection of ordinary people's opinions (usually given frankly and often bluntly critical of officials and Government policy) on his numerous trips around the country. A president cannot hope to be an effective universal ombudsman.

Acting On Consensus: Coercion and Correction

The accusation of naivety sometimes directed at Mwalimu in respect of his belief that teaching and negotiation would, or could, in all cases avoid the need to use coercive action is itself naïve. While deeply distrusting reaching decisions on the basis of small majorities rather than by near consensus after an educational process, he does believe that a legitimate State having reached a decision by legitimate methods has the duty as well as the right to enforce that decision. One example has been compulsory vaccination against contagious diseases; oddly so since

vaccination, while a priority health policy, is not in fact compulsory in Tanzania.

The nationalisation legislation, whatever its compensation provisions and room for bargaining, clearly demonstrates that Mwalimu was under no illusion about shifting the balance of economic power from external and minority owners to domestic public sector units accountable to the Government and, through it, to the citizens (at least in intent). This was a 'tea party' involving no more than polite discourse and amicable agreement. Similarly, residence in villages (albeit broadly defined) was made compulsory in 1973 because the president believed that living in communities and being accessible to public services were valid goals backed by broad majorities, justifying enforcement against minorities who could otherwise block their implementation. Significantly, communal production was not made mandatory (only encouraged and, to a degree, backed by preferential resource allocation) presumably because the president correctly believed there was no valid consensus in favour of it.

The second example illustrates a repeated problem of coercive action in Tanzania: diverse, often over-enthusiastic and sometimes improper action, in terms of the decision and its goals, at regional and district level. Oddly it was not primarily by officials who, by and large, opposed rapid villagisation as beyond their technical and resource capacity and, perhaps even more, as imposing too much work. Rather it was by local political leaders (most part-time and themselves farmers) whose disregard for adequate physical and teaching preparation, practicable phasing and avoiding random use of force, was in some cases awesome. It also illustrates that corrective mechanisms did exist in the system. The Government and in particular the president (once he realised the dissent was not merely that of a small minority opposing any change) did institute a corrective process to sort out misinterpretations, offer some redress (not very widespread or effective), and to seek to ensure that the second year's villagisation was much more flexible and consensual; which it was.

The problematic issue is again one of institutionalisation. With real Party and Government decentralisation the chances for both flexible and contextual implementation, and also for misunderstood and unnecessarily forcefully imposed implementation are heightened. This was repeatedly demonstrated from 1961 onwards in economic and other fields. It is highly doubtful whether access to higher-level Party and Government officials after the event (which did exist), leading to somewhat less than openly publicised correction (which usually happened), was and is adequate in terms of Mwalimu's development perspective. Fuller education on guidelines for articulators and implementers, together with a parallel monitoring process to suspend apparently unsound action while a review took place, should have been institutionalised. This is, of course, not a problem unique to Tanzania; British local tax policy and practice post-1988 illustrates the same flaws.

State, Government, Party and Law

Mwalimu views the State as a servant of the people and in particular of the poor majority. He does not suppose that most States are like that, but that a democratic State should be. This requires an activist State in two senses. First, it is not a neutral groundskeeper setting up a level cricket pitch (perhaps a good analogy as groundsmen can, and are expected to, create surfaces favourable to the home side). Rather, it is an actor on behalf of whatever interest groups or sub-class coalitions control it. Second, it must take an active role in providing services, regulation and market management not merely in supplying law, order and a stable macro-economic climate; important as they are. Access to basic services and opportunities to improve their livelihoods are important to poor people, as is infrastructure to the country more generally. At least in an African context therefore the State must be a major supplier because the private sector cannot afford to provide services accessible to poor people, nor to build and to operate an adequate national infrastructure.

That Nyerere favoured State corporations in respect of large-scale economic activity is true, but he did not view them as a first choice where mixed household-co-operative-communal activity appeared feasible, as it did in agriculture and retailing. Nor was Tanzania ever uniformly hostile to joint ventures or to private enterprise despite the actions taken in the early 1970s. Regulation was seen to pose almost more problems than ownership, and dominance of external ownership was believed to be inimical both to reinvestment of profits and to national participation in senior managerial positions. That view is not, as is sometimes implied, necessarily either particularly left-wing or uncommon among hard-headed economic pragmatists (*vide* Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and, for many years after World War II, France). In the late 1960s the only domestic institution with finance and personnel, or the capacity to mobilise them, and able to undertake leadership in the large enterprise sector was the State. Even then enterprises were virtually never run as Government departments but as relatively autonomous and accountable (in principle at least) economic units with fairly clear accounting and viability requirements. And through 1977 they did, as a group, achieve substantial after-tax investible surpluses.

Government and Party

Mwalimu has tended to view the government, including many ministers, as experts articulating and carrying out policy rather than as political decision-makers. This sits somewhat uneasily with ministers being MPs and those defeated not re-appointable; although appointed MPs can and do serve as ministers and, indeed, as Prime Minister. It also creates some problems of differentiating political decisions and their governmental articulation and implementation, with the latter subject to political review

but, in principle and to a significant degree in practice, not to day-to-day political intervention. The differentiation problem has always been greatest at local level where Government and Party are virtually the same and have not been distinguished from each other by most rural people.

The purpose of political bodies (the National Assembly for example) is in this perspective to listen to the people, to make basic policy decisions (usually but not necessarily on the basis of government proposals), and to oversee and review implementation. They are accountable to the people via periodic competitive elections as well as to Party members via a similar internal process including primary elections to choose general election candidates. That process clearly has been competitive at primary and general election stages as evidenced by a high non-re-election rate both in the Party and the National Assembly. Given the wide range of viewpoints in the Party, those changes do affect policy not merely office-holding personnel.

Single Party: Principle or Contextual Pragmatism

It is quite clear that Nyerere spearheaded the 1963-5 transition to a one-party system, as is discussed in the essay by Professor Kweka in this volume. What is not clear is whether Mwalimu saw a single Party as a matter of permanent principle or contextual pragmatism. Prior to its adoption he spoke of a need to review the position in about 25 to 30 years (1990-5). By the end of the 1980s he was tentatively, but soon more definitely, arguing that the time had come for a multi-party system even though mass public demand was notable by its absence. The reasons he initially advanced for a single Party, taken together with TANU's (subsequently CCM's) openness and internal competitiveness, the genuinely competitive general elections, and the reversion to multi-partyism before there was mass demand or particularly strong international pressure on Tanzania for it, strongly suggest that the contextual and pragmatic interpretation is the more accurate.

Mwalimu's attempts to revitalise and reform CCM over 1986-8 led him to believe that the prospect of losing office was necessary to achieve a renewed national-development-oriented dynamic in the Party. In May 1990 he argued that 'lack of opposition makes the Party feel complacent about its real or imagined existence', leading to a 'crisis of bureaucracy and dependency', a critique he had earlier propounded to the then Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda in respect of UNIP.

TANU and CCM have never been Marxist-Leninist parties and their policy stance (if not the rhetoric of some second-line personnel) has had more in common with radical social democracy than with Marxist-Leninist single-party policy or practice. Nor has it ever been a Vanguard Party. Because dues collection and record keeping were notoriously bad, it is unclear how many members it had, although it is probable that between one household in two and one in four has had a member, which is very high for voluntary membership parties. The failure of the pro-Vanguard Party campaigns within TANU/CCM was clearly the result of Mwalimu's stance.

He believed that a limited-access Party was inconsistent with broad participation and accountability. His reaction to that, as to other neo-Platonic guardianship proposals, was to enquire who was to guard against abuse by the guardians.

Mwalimu's thought, unlike that of most single-party advocates, seems basically pluralist. He certainly believes in integral accountability via electoral competition elements: a significant divergence from the vast majority of single-party systems. He did not, however, devise a mechanism to offset the reality that continued holding of office (even if with changing personnel) does tend to dull both accountability and strict morality, and that even a small opposition representation from a Party or Parties most unlikely to win a majority in the near future may improve performance on both counts; as in Botswana, The Gambia and Mauritius.

Rule of Law – Principle or Means

Tanzania has an independent judiciary and legal system whose greatest danger has usually been self-emasculation, not Government pressure. The Government has not infrequently lost cases with significant political overtones and has regularly accepted the verdicts both in the narrow sense of the case in hand and the broader sense of not legislating to alter the parameters for future decisions. It is difficult to attribute this commitment to the rule of law to anyone other than the first president (backed by his senior legal officers and most High Court judges), or to explain it on the grounds of pragmatism rather than of principle.

Five major problems have limited the effectiveness of the rule of law. The lower courts are not in general well regarded in terms of competence or probity. Access to the courts is expensive, and hard for the ordinary person to understand. Legislation (especially in administrative law) to provide a legal framework for altered policies is often unduly delayed, resulting in a legal vacuum with extant law anachronistic and inherently proper public policy not yet properly legally enacted. The police and the prosecution service are short of personnel, finance and expertise which limits the effectiveness of investigation and the quality of prosecutions. Preventive detention has been used, sometimes for political cases (usually actual or potential armed conspiracy) and for economic cases (largely relating to external transactions).

The first four problems are common even to wealthy Northern countries and relate primarily to the availability of resources (mainly skilled personnel but also, in the case of magistrates and clerks, levels of remuneration as well). The fourth, preventive detention, is also common (openly or covertly) but raises deeper questions of principle which are discussed at greater length in the essay by Professor Read in this volume.

Mwalimu appears to have viewed preventive detention as undesirable but less bad than the available alternatives. Rigged trials would have been worse; as would have allowing coup plots for which, while they were known

about, there was not the level of evidence required by a court. There was a deep general frustration that cases involving economic offences either could not be successfully prosecuted because of inadequate prosecutors or magistrates, or resulted in relatively trivial sentences. Attempts to improve the quality of prosecutions were made, as were statutory amendments, but with very limited success. The latter led to economic sabotage legislation which did not create any new offences not covered by existing statutes, but seriously eroded procedural safeguards. In the face of sharp criticism from the legal community, including the Attorney General, it was partly quietly dropped and partly reformed with procedural safeguards after an alarming, but brief, frenzy of accusations which threatened to become a witch-hunt.

Mwalimu clearly views the rule of law and an independent judiciary as matters of principle; like competitive elections and accountability. He has been willing to accept limited exceptions, notably preventive detention, but he failed to institutionalise the operation of prompt reporting of cases and of prompt quasi-independent review to reverse abuses in particular cases, although he did act, often belatedly, when such cases came to his attention.

Economic Strategy Preferences

Tanzania is unusual in that it has a demonstrable policy bias in favour of rural areas in respect to spending more than has been received on fiscal account; in relative price management (with grower prices for food raised more rapidly than wages let alone salaries); in the provision of credit and of *de facto* grower subsidies; in policy attention; and in a distinct perception that the Party and Government were primarily accountable to the rural peasant majority. That a substantial proportion of the resources were none too well directed, and that some of the policies and institutions were ill-designed, does not alter the fact of the allocations and their intent. For almost 25 years the differential between urban and rural incomes as well as inequality of access to basic services has been reduced. This is sufficiently atypical to suggest it must have some relationship to policy attention and resource allocation.

This rural bias has strongly characterised Nyerere's thinking. One reason is clear: most Tanzanians are poor rural dwellers primarily dependent on agriculture (albeit a significantly lower proportion today than in 1970 and much lower than in 1961). Therefore people-centred development had in his view to focus on rural communities. Another element is more problematic. Nyerere, because of his background, understood rural peasant households better than urban wage-earning ones and, at least until the mid-1980s, failed to recognise how many poor urban households there were.

This was compounded by a technical problem: rural production unit organisation on a mixed household/communal basis poses far fewer technological or economy-of-scale problems than does, say, a textile mill or a bank. Thus attempts to introduce wage worker participation in management were late (early 1970s), cautious, and largely dropped during the 1980s economic crises. The process was not helped by the opposition of the trade union which correctly feared that employment units based on Workers Councils would have more worker support than itself, and would (as they did) deal directly with the Party, Government and employers, exposing the single-channel national trade union as the unrepresentative idea-less shell it then was. Ironically, statutory wage increases have normally been proposed by the Treasury on equity and efficiency grounds with no significant Ministry of Labour or trade union input. Commendable as that may be, it underlines the weakness of the Ministry which was supposed to highlight wage-earner needs and the fact that in the case of the trade union, Party dominance led to a lack of initiative and dialogue, even though these weaknesses did not characterise CCM itself.

This analysis, if correct, explains both the positive priority focus on rural livelihoods and services, and the rather inadequately conceptualised and episodic attention given to urban poverty and to the role of wage workers in enterprise decision-making. The inadequate attention to urban poverty and urban infrastructure has been particularly evident in respect to towns other than Dar es Salaam. With up to 30 per cent of the population now urban residents, the accountability principle appears likely to increase political and policy attention to issues of urban poverty and livelihoods as to some extent it already has from the mid-1980s.

Equity – Affirmative Action

Equity (not equality, but a limited range of inequality resulting from superior quality and quantity of effort) is central to Mwalimu's strategic view of development. Policy has regularly sought to provide real increases, primarily to low-income earners (this is ironically much easier in respect of wage earners than peasants), and to allocate cuts progressively (that is, the higher the pre-cut welfare, the higher the proportion of cut). Similarly, moving forward universal access to basic services (primary and adult education, primary health services, accessible pure water and agricultural extension) has enjoyed priority in the social service sector. The falls in quality and quantity in the early 1980s were partially clawed back from 1985 onward, albeit with severe problems of continued infrastructure deterioration, especially in health.

In a poor country, priority to improving livelihood levels and basic service access of poor people necessarily means slower increases at the top. As president, Nyerere moved from a policy of not increasing top incomes to allow the bottom to catch up to an 'all boats float higher' position. The latter was, as became evident in the 1980s, technically and politically

possible only when resources per capita were expanding. Preferential allocation out of additional resources was, in the Tanzanian political economic context, relatively easy in the late 1960s and 1970s. Transfers out of shrinking resource in the 1980s to limit losses at the bottom of income distribution came to be gravely damaging to salary earner and small-business morale, as well as to many other individuals' self-perceived incentives. The president accepted that fact reluctantly, slowly, and only partially.

Markets – Means or Myths

For Mwalimu, markets are a means; an important institutional mechanism with strengths but also with limitations and distortions. Therefore, they can be made more serviceable to public policy when managed and/or regulated than when left to their own devices. This is in fact the standard position of political thinkers and of most politicians and, at least in respect to their own interests, of most business people. The serious operational arguments turn on identifying market distortions and on crafting measures which can reduce them without creating worse new distortions.

In the context of the 1980s, a substantial proportion of Tanzania's market management measures became highly inefficient; most notably, but not uniquely, agricultural marketing. While some of the problems may have been inherent, the better market management performance in the late 1960s and early 1970s (especially in attaining full recovery from the 1974-5 drought, oil price, and general terms of trade crises) suggests another important causal element. In a much more hostile world economy, with reduced import capacity and falling real wages, both institutional and personnel capacity eroded at the same time making increasing crisis containment necessary. The result was a sharp decline in quality of Government and public enterprise market management.

What to do was, and is, a question neither Nyerere nor his successors have resolved adequately. 'Muddling on' came to be seen as increasingly impractical, while reversion to pre-independence private enterprise market management was perceived as likely to restore 'natural' market failures without greatly assisting in providing incentives to producers. Mwalimu does appear at times to have confused institutional means with ends in his defence of certain, by no means all, pre-1980 institutional and policy arrangements.

Exports and Self-Reliance

While Mwalimu has seen diversification of production and reduction of dependence on imports as necessary components of the development process, he has not advocated trade minimisation nor delinking in the autarkic sense. His views are consistent with the perfectly respectable economic argument that some trade is better than no trade, but that maximisation of trade is not necessarily a valid objective.

He has therefore favoured export expansion on the basis of self-reliance.

Only the foreign exchange earned from exports can be allocated by a country, whatever mechanisms it chooses to use, on the basis of its own priorities. Indeed, in the early 1970s, he once used a quotation from Dom Helder Camara on the importance of developing primary exports into processed and manufactured exports goods as his Easter card message.

For reasons which are not self-evident, this is a field in which Nyerere's views, even though backed by the Treasury and usually by Commerce and Industry, were given low operational priority. The parts of overall strategy linked to export expansion, and especially their diversification/processing components, were repeatedly not acted upon. Therefore, not merely worsening terms of trade and an unfortunate initial export mix (plus over-valuation especially from 1981-6) but also the lack of any export diversification dynamic underlay Tanzania's dismal export performance after the mid-1960s.

By the time serious attention was paid to export rehabilitation and development after 1983, resource constraints (and the marked aversion in practice of donors to financing export projects) meant that recovery remained limited. In real import capacity terms, the export peak was 1966; an indicator of failure unmatched in any other economic sector. The second poorest series, real per capita external aid peaked in 1973-4. Together, these two series spell out the bed-rock problem confronting any development strategy in the 1980s.

Fiscal Policy, Exchange Rates, Inflation

On most macro-economic policy issues Nyerere's stance was basically cautious. He preferred current expenditure to be balanced by current revenue (essentially achieved until 1979) and fiscal laxity played a role (even if probably not a dominant role) in 1965 and 1979 when there were changes of Finance Minister.

The president very clearly understood that printing more money without producing or securing more goods to validate it was largely self-defeating. His analogy was parachuting sacks of money onto a flood-isolated island instead of sacks of grain. While he never supposed prices could be frozen by fiat, he may have put too much faith both in price management and fiscal policy as means to avoid or to manage down inflation.

Both fiscal balance and limited price movements have been seen by Mwalimu as instrumental and desirable, but not as overriding imperatives nor as ends in themselves. The same, contrary perhaps to popular impression, holds for his views on exchange rates (a managed price). Over 1967-1973 Tanzania had a relatively active exchange rate policy which avoided both massive changes and over-valuation.

His subsequent aversion to devaluation has been in large part a reaction to the IMF's apparent belief that devaluation is virtually always desirable and good on moral as well as on pragmatic contextual grounds, and its rather bullying preaching of that fundamentalist creed. This certainly led

over 1980-3 to a reluctance to agree to devaluations, whoever proposed them, which was unwise but did not represent any adherence to non-devaluation as an end in itself. (During 1982-5 Tanzania did devalue several times).

On each of the above issues Mwalimu's views flowed in general from his perception of economic policy as primarily a set of tools to construct development and, in particular, from a combination of contextual pressures and from the advice of ministers, civil servants and academics he trusted; predominantly but not exclusively Tanzanians. The period when they appeared least coherent was 1981-4 when he was receiving very sharply divergent advice from his main economic ministers and their civil servant/advisor teams.

National Development, African Regionalism and the World Economy

National Development/National Community

Julius Nyerere's perception of development is primarily national within a continental and an intercontinental context. National because that is the largest community which can, at least in the medium term, be made meaningful in Africa. One might query whether in many African States the nation is a viable community, but in Tanzania the answer is increasingly affirmative in respect of mainland Tanzania, although not in respect of the Union with Zanzibar. Indeed the continuing viability of Tanzania as a nation State with a real sense of national community is one of Mwalimu's most notable successes.

In a broader context Mwalimu is well aware of the fact that individual African States, even relatively large ones like Tanzania, are small, weak and unilaterally externally dependent. His early analogy was that small and weak nations are like indecently dressed women: they tempt the evil-minded.

African Regionalism: Pragmatic, Substantial Incrementalism

Mwalimu has consistently been an advocate of African regionalism. While now viewed as a radical on this topic, he was in fact deeply doubtful of the realism of jumping from national to continental, and from limited contacts and economic links, to supra-national union. In the early Pan African debates he was the cautious, pragmatic incrementalist to Nkrumah's visionary (and, arguably, totally impracticable) radicalism.

Regionally he aspired to joint independence of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (even if it delayed Tanganyika's independence). From the failure of that initiative and its 1963 successor, he came to view supra-nationalism, as opposed to the common pursuit of mutually identified common

interests, as impractical, and the economic arena as the main avenue for building regionalism paralleled by common support for liberation movements through what became the Frontline States (FLS).

The East African Community (EAC), in its incarnation as the East African Common Market/East African Common Services Organisation, was basically a Kenya-centric colonial inheritance. Tanzanian efforts to reform it appeared to progress over 1965-70 but, following the Amin coup in Uganda, the basis for further progress disintegrated and the 1970s economic crisis (together with the deep animosity of a significant fraction of the Kenyan leadership to the EAC and Tanzania) swept away the EAC.

The Zanzibar Union was not a direct product of Mwalimu's commitment to regionalism. Pre-Union Zanzibar had an unstable Government in danger of becoming a pawn dependent on, and controlled by, one or more external powers and with the possibility of external counter-coups against client regimes. Given its proximity to, and links with, Tanganyika that prospect alarmed the mainland Government and, not least, the president. A confederal Union on terms very favourable to Zanzibar (and systematically abused by them on the economic front to be still more exploitatively advantageous) was hastily concluded. Zanzibari practice has rarely been congruent with the Mainland, was often deeply embarrassing to Nyerere and his Government, and infuriated Tanzanian economic technocrats and the average Tanzanian.

The Union is not a success except in the sense that it spared Zanzibar (and Mainland Tanzania) from the islands becoming another Comoros. It is doomed if a referendum is held. A majority in favour in Zanzibar is slightly more likely than not; a huge majority against the Union on the Mainland would be virtually certain.

The clearest example of what Mwalimu sees as a viable road to first stage economic and regional co-ordination, leading ultimately to broader (in content and scope) Pan-Africanism is the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Beginning as the economic arm of the FLS, it immediately added the three non-FLS independent States in its region and has become, with the independence of Namibia and the attainment of Black majority rule in South Africa, more important than its parent.

SADC is a very atypical regional body. Its principles of selection are mutually perceived common interests better, or only, pursued jointly. Goods, services and knowledge-production co-ordination leading to trade, not tariff cuts leading to production, constitute its strategic thrust. In that sense it is the only African conceptualised regional body. The others are all too clearly import models imperfectly modified from the EEC even if they are promoted by Africans. Perhaps not coincidentally SADC is the most successful. It has recognised external dependence for investment resources as a fact of life and set out to influence its level and allocation by reasoned, regional priority project/programme packages. Its Annual Conference is

the only continuing Consultative Group overwhelmingly designed, staffed and managed by the recipients.

Africa, the World Economy and the South

In the mid 1960s and again in the 1980s Mwalimu feared that Africa would in fact be pushed out of the international economy. He was never an advocate of autarky, but of managed and less unequal external economic relations. Over 1968-80 he appears to have believed progress toward international economic reform (on the basis of a social democratic shift in international economic structures toward lesser inequality and a greater role in decision-making for poor countries in line with the stillborn Brandt Report) was practicable.

While always an advocate of South-South co-operation, and of a technical infrastructure to make it operational, his raising of it to top strategic priority (as exemplified by his chairing the South Commission) came from the 1980s disillusion with the trajectory of the world economy. His present position is that South-South (as well as African regional) economic linkage must be developed both to reduce unilateral dependence on the North and to increase bargaining leverage with the North. Whether he is very optimistic as to short-term progress on this road is a somewhat different question.

Mwalimu, the Fund and the Bank

Nyerere has acquired a reputation as a root-and-branch enemy of the World Bank and, much more pointedly, the IMF. While by no means wholly wrong, at least so far as the Fund is concerned, this is somewhat simplistic. Until 1979 Tanzania's relations with both Fund and Bank were relatively good. Robust dialogue took place on occasion but at no time threatened continued broadly amicable relations. The neo-liberal prescriptions of the Fund and the Bank in the early 1980s (from which the Bank at least has in large measure resiled over the past five years) certainly would have increased tensions and led to more agreements to disagree. The assurance with which simplistic partial prescriptions, without adequate contextual diagnoses, were rather casually put forward as universal curatives, would have led to robust criticism for failure to be adequately expert or pragmatic.

But the real anger, and, on occasion, very atypical shouting, by Nyerere has a rather different cause. After 1980 Tanzania was far more dependent on external resource transfers than before, and the Fund and Bank were rapidly building up gatekeeper and co-ordinator roles so that they significantly influenced all official resource transfers not just their own. On that basis they sought to provide or impose overall economic policy prescriptions with, in many cases, a marked lack of diplomatic skills. Given the importance Nyerere attached to economic policy as a key element in attaining development, this was seen by him (not necessarily erroneously) as *de facto* recolonisation by fairly crude financial blackmail. That was totally unacceptable as a matter of principle, unlike policy debate disagreement

and compromise on particular projects or policies.

The 1984-6 transition to working relations with Fund and Bank was backed by Nyerere as a necessary step to revive resource inflows. It did not alter his view that the Bank and Fund were acting on behalf of a deeply inequitable world economic system, operating from an inadequate development vision, and using unacceptably coercive tactics. Once he had retired as president he felt quite justified in voicing these views.

The Vision and the Record

How Does One Evaluate Thought?

To evaluate a political and social thinker on the immediate results of his ideas is hardly reasonable or normal; unless they simply vanish without a trace. Socrates was forced to commit suicide, Christ was crucified, Machiavelli never regained his lost posts, Adam Smith's ideas influenced policy with a lag of about three-quarters of a century, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill are not remembered as parliamentarians.

On the tests of whether the issues he addresses are of lasting importance, whether his approach is both incisive and insightful and whether it is, directly or indirectly, still of live concern both to scholars and to persons interested in political processes (not least Tanzanians and Southern Africans), Mwalimu's vision stands up well. It is in fact more congruent with present 'second liberation' thought than it was with the dominant African political thinking and practice of 1960-85.

One characteristic of Mwalimu's thought is that it is rooted in African thought (tradition) but is also clearly innovative (individual talent). At the same time it is also influenced and informed by political and social thinking from traditions outside Africa and in a style accessible both to Africans and globally. That is relatively unusual as most writing grounded in African tradition interacts only to a limited extent with other traditions, while most Western-influenced African thought (as with most Soviet-influenced thought) appears to have rather shallow African roots.

And Political Leadership?

Mwalimu Nyerere has never claimed to be primarily a thinker in the academic or detached analyst sense, but rather to be primarily a practising politician and aspiring statesman. It is therefore relevant to look at the heritage of the 25 years during which he led independent Tanzania before retiring as president (or the nearly 30 years before retiring as Party chairman). On the political/national community side especially in comparison to other African States, the heritage is positive:

- A tradition of competitive elections and accountability (leading to a

relatively smooth and unforced opening of the political arena to multi-party competition) has been established, and within it is a sense of fair play. (Multi-partyism was, for example, assumed to require a rapid, total end to State finance for any Party, including the governing one.)

- An orderly succession with the Head of State retiring voluntarily followed by a genuine debate (within the Party) on his successor.
- Only limited institutional changes, notably limiting the term of office of successor presidents (since Mwalimu shared the general view he was unlikely to abuse power, but that this might not be true of all his successors), were needed at the time of transition to the next president.
- A genuine choice of leaders, from president on, existed; Nyerere was not the great baobab tree under which nothing grew, rather his style of governance did allow a new generation of political leaders to emerge.
- Tanzanians do view their State as legitimate, their Government as basically public spirited (even if their views on its competence and the quality of some present leaders are much less uniformly positive) and their nation as a symbol and community with a real meaning for them.
- Ethnic, religious and sub-national tensions, while not absent, are no higher than in many old-established States, and the use of force to deal with domestic issues is very much the exception (not least because to use the army domestically is not seen as an option and the police have never been given the resources to act as enforcers for repressive measures).
- Because of the pluralism within CCM, and the presence of relatively strong local and national non-governmental broad-membership bodies (especially, but not only, religious ones, nationally and locally), Tanzania has a relatively strong and plural civil society as well as moderately secure rule of law (only moderately because of widespread public disapproval of the magistracy), and substantial room for the exercise of 'traditional' human rights.
- While perhaps less widely assented to, there is a substantial majority for continued emphasis on broad access (directed toward universal) basic services provided by the State which, by whatever method, do not exclude on the grounds of poverty, and a belief that equity and moral economy are among the proper concerns of Government.

It is an impressive heritage, not simply in the African context or in contrast with 1961 in Tanzania, but also in a world in which explosive intra-national conflicts are epidemic, and alienation from both State and civil society

increasingly prevalent in Northern as well as Southern polities.

What Economic Results?

It would be idle to assert that the economic growth or even the structural transformation heritage of Tanzania's first thirty years of independence is equally positive. Large numbers of mistakes, some always likely to be such and others not corrected promptly when problems emerged, can be cited. The fact that many decisions, especially in agriculture and agricultural marketing, were made on the basis of expert foreign advice (often from bodies who now criticise Tanzania for having acted as it did on their earlier advice) is not a basis for exoneration. Tanzania, including Nyerere, should have queried much of this advice, and the way it was being inserted, rather earlier than it did.

That said, the macro-economic record is far better than is usually supposed. Over 1961-78 Tanzanian output grew by somewhat over 4 per cent a year (perhaps 1.5 per cent per capita) and food production by 3.5 per cent (1 per cent per capita). Neither is brilliant but both are well above both the Tanganyika colonial record and the SSA averages. In 1990 constant price output stood about one-sixth above 1980 (versus virtually unchanged for SSA as a whole), per capita it was about one-tenth down (versus a fifth to a quarter fall for SSA overall), and food production per capita continued on a slowly rising trend (very much an exception). While somewhat above the SSA average, Tanzania's net per capita external resource flow (which peaked in 1973-4) ranged around 10th to 15th of the 40 SSA economies for which data are relatively readily available. In addition, its export mix has faced poor market conditions so no external *deus ex machina* exists to explain the above-average result in what from a perspective of resource quality and geographic location is a below-average piece of real estate.

The ranking of Tanzania in per capita dollar terms as the world's second poorest economy (with a fall of over 50 per cent in the 1980s) is artifactual, coloured both by very rapid devaluation and inadequate adjustment of the prices used in GDP calculations. The constant price output summaries give a better picture.

Tanzania has a relatively equitable distribution system if the key criteria chosen are the limited numbers in destitution, without significant access to basic public services, or not assisted in the context of natural disasters. Famine deaths have been unknown in Tanzania since somewhat before independence, and remained so during the 1992-3 food scarcity period following the partial 1991-2 drought. Life expectancy, literacy and reduction of malnutrition show better results and/or trends than is typical for low income SSA countries.

The post-1984 recovery appeared by 1992 to have restored an overall growth trend of about 4 per cent; 3 per cent to 3.5 per cent for food; and 6 per cent for manufacturing. But on those trends and a 2.75 per cent

population growth rate, restoring 1980 per capita overall and manufacturing output levels would take until 1998-2000 and to regain the 1978 peaks would take until perhaps 2002-4 even if neither natural calamities, nor economic catastrophes set back the pace of growth. Whether that pace is adequate to maintain a high level of effort or would lead to implosion is problematic, even if the growth pattern is better than current prospects for a majority of African economies.

More seriously, the inherited and continuing lack of an articulated export strategy makes the present recovery dependent on external finance because under 40 per cent of minimum necessary imports (at 4 per cent overall growth) is earned from exports. The past random delinking from old exports accentuated by terms of trade collapse means that at least \$500-600 million a year (1990 prices) of new and value-added exports is needed to restore reasonable external account self-reliance. No one, including the World Bank, has the slightest operational scenario of how this might be achieved, nor is a coherent set of product studies to identify key potential components in progress.

Thus, while Tanzania's economic performance has usually been, and is again, above the SSA average and better than might have been expected, it is below Tanzanian expectations, possibly below sustainable levels and dangerously flawed on the external account self-reliance front. That heritage, whatever its causes, is a deeply problematic one. Had Mwalimu opted for policy shifts earlier in the 1980s (rather than allowing three years drift while seeking consensus) and placed his full influence behind export diversification and expansion from 1970 onward, the situation would be objectively better and the prospects significantly less problematic. On the economic institutional and personnel side, the situation is also mixed. The numbers of competent economic civil servants, academics and, to a lesser extent, managers (private or public) is relatively impressive especially in contrast to 1961. The basic State economic institutions are in working order, as are a growing number of public enterprises. But the entire structure has been strained by constant crises, disappointed by failed efforts and made less diligent by radical erosion of real salaries. In contrast to many nominally less poor SSA economies, Tanzania's economic personnel and institutions are impressive. Nonetheless, they are at most barely adequate for managing continued recovery and less than adequate in several sectors for relaunching sustained development.

Try and Try Again

A Tanzanian characteristic shared by Mwalimu Nyerere and which has been valuable in the past, is setting high goals and being very critical if they are not met, even if substantial progress was made in the right direction; this characteristic is in danger of becoming negative. The major achievements of 1984-1992 (grounded in the last major economic policy changes Nyerere contributed to and presided over) are seriously underrated with a danger of

an implosion and descent into fatalistic acceptance of an inability to influence events which would be very dangerous; not least in leading to a fatalistic failure to seek to hold present office-holders to high standards. This is not helped by CCM's tendency to repeat old slogans as mantras rather than to restate its continued commitment to equity, access and poverty reduction in terms relevant to 1990s challenges, possibilities and achievements.

Despite mistakes, some still not learned from nor corrected, a more appropriate valediction on the present state of Mwalimu Nyerere's heritage as a human-centred development practitioner may be the Kisanaki proverb he used in respect to South-South efforts:

Rabbit, Rabbit, where are you going?
 I am going out to kill the elephant.
 Can you really do that?
 Well, I'll try and try again.